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PURGING CORRUPTION FROM PUBLIC CONTRACTING:
THE "SOLUTIONS" ARE NOW PART OF THE PROBLEM
FRANK ANECHIARICO* & JAMES

B.

JACOBS"

I. INTRODUCTION

New York City is one of the biggest contracting entities in the world.

Each year City agencies enter into approximately 40,000 contracts worth

almost $6.5 billion, about one-fourth of the total City budget. 1 These
contracts cover everything from pencils to legal services for indigent

criminal defendants, from methadone treatment to architectural
consultants, from external auditing to massive public works projects.2
Awarding and monitoring these contracts is one of city government's great

responsibilities.
The whole public contracting process, its law and administration, is

significantly affected by the goal of preventing corruption and, more
recently, even the appearance of corruption.3

Money can be easily

siphoned from the government's coffers by sweetheart contractsinvolving

kickbacks to officials. 4 Public officials can award contracts to firms in
* Professor, Department of Government, Hamilton College, Clinton, New York.

Professor of Law, New York University Law School. The authors are grateful
to Kimberly Potter for excellent assistance in the preparation of this article. They also
express thanks to the Filomen D'Agostino and Max E. Greenberg Research Fund at the
New York University School of Law, which provided generous support for this project.
1. NEW YORK STATE COMM'N ON GOV'T INTEGRrTY, A Ship Without a Captain:
The ContractingProcessin New York City, in GOVERNMENT ETICS FOR THE 1990S, at
461, 465 (1990) [hereinafter A Ship Without a Captain].
2. See A Ship Without a Captain, supra note 1, at 461; see also Martin Gottlieb,
Money and Meters: A Window on City Contracts-A Special Report, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan.
31, 1991, at Al (discussing, as an example of City contracting, the process by which a
small Kentucky company came to be New York City's chief contractor for water meters).
3. See Bruce J. Bergman, Public Contracts: Rejecting the IrresponsibleBidder,
Part I, N.Y. ST. B.J., July 1985, at 22 (examining New York State's competitive
bidding laws and policies) [hereinafter Bergman I]; see also infra text accompanying
notes 53 & 54.
4. See Michael Mecham, 'Ill Wind' Guilty PleasShow Pattern ofBasic Corruption,
AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH., Apr. 3, 1989, at 24 (discussing the United States
Department of Justice fraud and bid-rigging case against several major defense
contractors).
**
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which they, their families, friends, or associates have a financial interest.'
Over the years, layer upon layer of reforms have been added to the public
contracting process in order to immunize it from taint of corruption.6
The dilemma is that in trying to corruption-proof public contracting,
corruption controllers mire the process in red tape, undermining the
government's capacity to carry out essential goals and, ironically, creating
new opportunities for corruption and fraud.7 In this Article, we will see
how, over the years, anti-corruption mechanisms, including scrupulous
neutrality in choosing contractors and multiple layers of investigation and
accountability, have transformed the public contracting process into a
labyrinth that jeopardizes governmental efficiency and flexibility.
We do not claim that there is an easy resolution of this tension.
Clearly, however, the public contracting process must be thoroughly
scrutinized for structures, rules, procedures, and practices that, while
adopted for reasons of corruption control, may have long since proven
ineffective and even counterproductive. Corruption control ought not to be
the tail that wags the public administration dog.
Part II of this Article reviews the evolution in New York City of the
preferred system of public contracting-competitive bidding and award to
the lowest responsible bidder-and connects that history to the politics of
scandal and reform and to the continuous aspiration of good government
reformers to create a corruption-proof contracting system. Part III
examines the extraordinary efforts of the contemporary Comptroller's
Office to police the contracting system in order to deny contracts to
"disreputable" business persons.
Part IV shows how the School
Construction Authority has taken the anti-corruption project to new heights
in its design of a contracting system that will not only assure the integrity
of its contractors but will also contribute to the attack on organized crime.
Part V considers the impacts of the modern-day integrity-oriented public
contracting system on public administration and whether governmental
efficiency and effectiveness have been sacrificed. Finally, Part VI asks
whether there is any way to determine whether the more integrity-oriented
contracting system has been successful on its own terms, i.e. reducing
corruption and organized-crime racketeering.

5. See, e.g., Erie Schmitt, Guilty Plea By Unisys Is Evpected, N.Y. TIME, Sept.
6, 1991, at D1 (describing the bid-rigging and procurement fraud perpetrated by Unisys,
a Federal government defense contractor).
6. See A Ship Without a Captain, supra note 1, at 465-69 (describing New York
City's contracting procedures as a "crazy quilt of inconsistent policies and procedures").
7. See id. at 469-81 (examining several specific requirements of New York City's
contracting system and concluding that it actually deters competition for contracts).
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II. CoMPETIvE BIDDING IN NEW YoRK CITY
A. Early History
Competitive bidding, the preferred method of letting contracts in New
York and throughout the country, was adopted in the aftermath of a
corruption scandal. The most notorious scandal in nineteenth-century New
York City involved the award and administration of contracts for the
construction of the New York County courthouse. In 1858, the County
Board of Supervisors allocated $250,000 for this project Four years
later, Tammany Hall boss William Marcy Tweed and his supporters
gained control of the Board. 9 By the time the courthouse was completed
over a decade later, its cost had escalated to more than eight million
dollars.10 Boss Tweed and his cronies steered lucrative contracts to firms
that gave them kickbacks or in which they had personal financial
interests." They allowed contractors to pad their bills in exchange for
a percentage of the fraudulent overcharges. 2 It has been estimated that,
from the courthouse alone, Tweed and his friends siphoned more than
seven million dollars. 3
In one of the bursts of reform fervor that punctuate New York City
history, reformers in the 1870s threw out the Tweed ring and eventually
sent Tweed to prison.14 The new administration created the Office of the
Commissioner of Accounts (OCA) (the precursor of today's Department
of Investigation) and redesigned the contracting system so that City
officials did not have unconstrained discretion in awarding contracts."
8.

HAROLD SEIDMAN,

INVESTIGATING MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATION 11 (1941)

(discussing the origins of political corruption in New York City, starting with Boss
Tweed and his cronies at Tammany Hall, who are estimated to have cheated the City out
of 50 million (19th Century!) dollars).
9. See generally ALEXANDERB. CALLOW JR., THETWEED RING (1966) (recounting
Boss Tweed's exploits in the New York County Courthouse scandal, calling it his
masterpiece of graftsmanship).

10. SEIDMAN, supra note 8, at 11.
11. See id. at 11, 12; CALLOW, supra note 9.
12. See SEIDMAN, supra note 8; CALLOW, supra note 9.
13. SEIDMAN, supra note 8; see CALLOW, supra note 9, at 197. For further
background on Boss Tweed and Tammany Hall, see ALFRED CONNABLE & EDWARD
SILBERFARB, TIGERS OF TAMMANY: NINE MEN WHO RAN NEW YORK (1967); JEROME
MuSHKAT, TAMMANY: THE EVOLUTION OF A POLITICAL MACHINE, 1789-1865 (1971);
GUSTAVUS MYERS, THE HISTORY OF TAMMANY HALL (1971).

14. SEIDMAN, supra note 8, at 12.
15. Id. at 13.
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The reformers fought for the adoption of competitive bidding, whose roots

in the federal system go back to the Revolutionary War.16
B. The Essentials of Competitive Bidding
Competitive bidding, sometimes called the "lowest responsible
bidding system," requires the government agency seeking to purchase

goods or services to publicize its specifications and invite bids from

anyone wishing to provide those goods or services.17 Prospective
contractors submit bids specifying their prices to perform the contract. 8
The bids are reviewed and the contract is awarded to the lowest

responsible bidder.9

In theory, a city using a competitive lowest

responsible bidder system benefits from (1) lowest price, (2) prevention
of official corruption, and (3) providing equal opportunities to all
contractors.'
One of the drumbeats of anti-corruption reformers has

been that a higher percentage of contracts be awarded by this competitive
bidding method.21

It is important to stress that competitive bidding awards contracts, not

to the lowest bidder, but to the lowest responsible bidder.'

Under

statutes and case law, "responsible" has been interpreted to mean
financially and technically capable of carrying out the terms of the
contract.'
Some New York courts, however, have upheld agency
refusals to award a contract to a low bidder because the contractor, while
16. See JAMES F. NAOLE, FEDERAL PROCUREMENT REOuLATIONS: POLICY,
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURES 12-13 (1987) (reviewing national procurement policies of
the American colonies during the American Revolutionary War).
17. See N.Y. CrY CHARTER ch. 13, § 313(a)-(b)(1) (1994).
18. See id. § 313 (describing the competitive sealed bidding procedure).
19. Id. § 313(a).
20. See Bergman I, supranote 3 (discussing the requirement that bidders for public
contracts be "responsible" and examining cases dealing with the issue); Bruce J.
Bergman, Public Contracts: Rejecting the IrresponsibleBidder, Part II, N.Y. ST. B.J.,
Oct. 1985, at 43 [hereinafter Bergman I1] (same); Bruce J. Bergman, Reletting the
Abandoned or Defaulted Public Works Project in New York-To Bid or Not to Bid?, 3
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 451, 451-53 (1975) (noting that the New York courts have
interpreted contracting laws as having the purposes of preventing corruption, favoritism
and reckless expenditure).
21. See A Ship Without a Captain, supra note 1, at 484.
22. See N.Y. CrrY CHARTER ch. 13, § 313.
23. See, e.g., Picone v. City of New York, 29 N.Y.S.2d 539, 541 (1941) ("That
term [responsible] does not mean one who is only pecuniarily responsible but one who
also possesses moral worth.").
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technically and financially capable, was not morally responsible.' The
courts have also held that, since there is no right to a public contract,
agencies could declare would-be contractors non-responsible without a due
process hearing.'
The competitive bidding system has become an article of faith in New
York City and in other local, state, and federal governmental units despite

frequent charges that it generates shoddy work, delay, fraud, and
corruption.' Other types of procurement-emergency, sole source, and
small purchase-are seen as suspect, especially by good government
Interestingl} enough, many
reformers and moral entrepreneursY

bureaucrats support the competitive bidding system,

perhaps because

it shields them from accusations or insinuations of corruption.
C. Scandal and Reform of Public Contracting in the 1980s
The 1986 New York City Parking Violations Bureau (PVB) scandals
reinforced distrust of and opposition to non-competitively bid contracts. 29
The PVB used the sole-source exception to competitive bidding' to

award sweetheart contracts for collecting parking fines to companies with

connections to top PVB officials and Democratic Party bosses, Donald
Manes and Stanley Friedman.3" Even when competitive bids were sought
by the PVB, the process was corruptly manipulated. The City's contract

for hand-held computers was "fixed" for Citisource, the firm in which

Stanley Friedman was the controlling shareholder. 2 Citisource played a
hidden role in writing the City's specifications. Geoffrey Lindenauer,
PVB deputy director and a Citisource shareholder, approved the contract
24. Id.; see also Bergman I, supra note 3, at 22-24 (discussing court cases so
holding); Bergman II, supra note 20, at 43-45 (same).
25. See, e.g., Erving v. Mayor of New York, 29 N.E. 1101 (N.Y. 1892). See
generally Bergman I, supra note 3; Bergman II, supra note 20.
26. See A Ship Without a Captain, supra note 1, at 469-80 (describing in detail the
problems caused by New York City's competitive bidding system).
27. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 13, § 315 (emergency procurement); § 321 (sole
source procurement); § 322 (alternative procurement procedures) (1994); see also
Bergman, Reletting The Abandoned or Defaulted Public Works Projectin New York-To
Bid or Not to Bid?, supra note 20, at 462-63.
28. See A Ship Without a Captain, supra note 1, at 480-81.
29. See JACK NEWFIELD & WAYNE BARRETT, CITY FOR SALE 12-14 (1988)
(recounting the Parking Violations Bureau scandal).
30. See N.Y. CrTy CHARTER ch. 13, § 321.
31. NEWFIELD & BARRETT, supra note 29, at 12-14, 17.
32. Id. at 104.
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specifications in a way that gave Citisource an enormous advantage. 3
Despite criticism of Citisource by the PVB's technical unit head,
Lindenauer pushed the contract through.' Indeed, he fired the technical
unit head and lied to PVB's contract selection committee, telling its
members that he had visited the Citisource plant and seen the hand-held
computers.35 In reality, Citisource was a shell company created by
Manes, Lindenauer and Friedman: it had no assets, no employees, no
history of operations, and no hand-held computers.3 6
The media and reformers blasted the contracting process that
permitted officials to bypass or manipulate the competitive bidding
system.'
The State Comptroller testified before the Charter Revision
Commission that two billion dollars, or forty percent of all City contracts,
is awarded absent competitive bidding, the basic safeguard of our public
contracting. This figure represents nearly ten percent of the New York
City budget. Comptroller Regan also said that no-bid contract awards
were an activity which had been so poorly managed and so little controlled
that they had become an open invitation to steal.3 8
A Koch administration official told us that aversion to non-competitive
bidding became so strong after the PVB scandals that several public
officials were fired for failing to use competitive bidding to award a barge
contract (to house jail inmates) to a company with which the agency had
a good long-term relationship. 9 When the corruption scandals erupted
in 1986, the Charter Revision Commission, appointed several years earlier
to redesign City government, was already well into its deliberations about
the future structure of City government.'
According to one of the
33. See id. at 247.
34. See id. at 247-48.
35. See id. at 248-49.
36. See id. at 245.
37. Id. at 40-45. For a final note on the PVB scandal, see Robert D. McFadden,
$1.4 Million in Restitution in Parking Bureau Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1995, at
27 (noting that the 385 investors in Citisource will receive restitution totalling $1.39
million).
38. See N.Y. State Comptroller Edward V. Regan, statement delivered to the New
York City Charter Revision Commission (Oct. 15, 1987).
39. Anonymous interview.
40. The New York City Charter has been revised several times since it was initially
adopted in 1897. The Commission's goals, as set out by the State legislature, generally
include the encouragement of citizen participation in local City government, the
achievement of effective local self-government, and the assurance that local City
government is responsive to the needs of its citizens. See NEW YORK CITY CHARTER
REvISION COMM'N, FINAL REP. OF THE N. Y. Cnry CHARTER REVISION COMM'N: JAN.

1989 - Nov. 1989 (1990).
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principle drafters, the charter's new procurement system was shaped
primarily in reaction to the corruption scandals. 41 The 1989 charter
restricts the types of contracts (principally emergency) that can be awarded
without competitive bids.42 In an emergency, defined as "an unforeseen
danger to life, safety, property or a necessary service," contracts may be
let without competitive bidding.43 The charter also excuses an agency
from competitive bidding where it is "not practicable or not
advantageous."" The agency head must submit a written explanation to
the Procurement Policy Board4' for approval." Competitive bidding
may also be avoided where there is only one source for the goods or
services (a sole source contract)47 or where the contract is for $500 or
less." In all other cases, competitive bidding must be used and the
contract let to the lowest responsible bidder.49
D. Standards of Integrityfor Responsible Bidders
In order to be deemed responsible by a contract-letting agency,
contractors must satisfy integrity standards. Moreover, the charter permits
the Comptroller to object to the award of a contract and to an agency's
designation of a particular contractor as responsible, "if in the
Comptroller's judgment there is sufficient reason to believe that there is
possible corruption . . . or that the proposed contractor is involved in
corrupt activity. "I
The 1989 charter revision established a Procurement Policy Board
(PPB) and authorized it, for the first time in New York City history, to set
City-wide contracting policy.5" Within a year, the PPB issued several
hundred pages of regulations covering every aspect of contracting. 2 The
preamble to this comprehensive procurement code states that one of the
underlying purposes of the rules is "to safeguard the integrity of the
41. Anonymous interview.
42. See N.Y. CrrY CHARTER ch. 13, § 312(a)(2) (1994).
43. Id. § 315.

44. Id. § 312(b)(2).
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

See infra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
N.Y. CrrY CHARTER ch. 13, § 312(a)(2) (1994).
Id. § 321.
Id. § 314.
Id. § 313(b)(2).
Id. § 328(c).
Id. § 311.
RuLEs OF THE CrY OF N.Y., vol. 4, tit. 9, §§ 1-01 to 15-07 (1994).
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procurement system and protect against corruption, waste, fraud and
abuse." 53 In a "Statement of Ethics Policy," the rules explain that:
City contracting personnel work under the constant scrutiny of
their superiors, their peers, contractors and prospective
contractors, the press and the public.
Public employees
responsible for the expenditure of billions of taxpayer dollars

have a responsibility to ensure that their conduct will not violate
the public trust placed in them.

They must make certain that

their conduct does not raise suspicion or give the appearance that
they are in violation of their public trust. It is not too much to say
that City contracting personnel must be above reproach. Their
actions must be governed at all times by the highest standards of
honesty, integrity and impartiality. Rules cannot address

specifically every incident or situation which may arise. But
certain fundamental rules and principles apply. "'

The Statement of Ethics Policy sets forth cardinal rules to guide the
conduct of public officials involved in procurement, including: (1) always

encouraging competition, preventing and avoiding favoritism, and
obtaining the best value for the City; (2) accepting no gifts, favors, or

entertainment from contractors or prospective contractors, and placing the
public interest above self-interest; (3) not using confidential information
obtained in the performance of City duties; and (4) reporting corruption
and unethical practices, wherever and whenever discovered, to the
appropriate official.55
53. Id. § 1-01(b)(8). The other stated goals are:
(1) to simplify, clarify, and modernize the law governing procurement by the
City of New York; (2) to permit the continued development of procurement
policies and practices; (3) to make as consistent as possible the uniform
application of these policies throughout New York City agencies; (4) to
provide for increased public confidence in New York City's procurement
procedures; (5) to ensure the fair and equitable treatment of all persons who
deal with the procurement system of the City of New York; (6) to provide for
increased efficiency, economy and flexibility in City procurement activities and
to maximize to the fullest extent the purchasing power of the City; (7) to foster
effective broad-based competition from all segments of the vendor community,
including small businesses, women and minority-owned and operated
enterprises; (8) to ensure appropriate public access to contracting information;
and (9) to foster equal employment opportunities in the policies and practices
of contractors and subcontractors wishing to do business with the City.
Id. § 1-01(b)(1)-(10).
54. Id. § 1-01(c).

55. Id. § 1-01()(1)-(7).
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E. The VENDEX System for Monitoring the
Characterof Public Contractors
The procurement code requires each agency's chief contracting officer
and chief administrator to determine whether a contractor or vendor is
financially, operationally, and morally responsible. 6 The burden of
proof on the issue of responsibility falls on the contractor.' In order to
be deemed responsible, a vendor must demonstrate a satisfactory record
of business activity. 8 City officials have established a computerized
database, Vendor Information Exchange System (VENDEX), to assist
officials in determining whether the contractor is morally qualified to do
business with the City. 9 Firms and their principals must complete an
extensive VENDEX questionnaire (twenty-seven pages for business entities
and thirteen pages for principals) about the business, its principals, its tax
returns, and its history of government contracting.' Former executive
director of the PPB, Constance Cushman, stated that "the burden in filling
out these forms is so great it can discourage small or minority-owned
contractors from bidding."a'
The questionnaire also contains such
questions as:
Has this business or any subsidiary of this business, or any
current or former directors, principals, officers, or managerial
employees of this business, either before or during their
employment:
* been formally debarred from being awarded a contract
or been informed that it could not bid on a contract by
any government agency?

56. Id. § 5-02(a); see Picone v. City of New York, 29 N.Y.S.2d 539 (1941).
57. RULES OF THE CITY OF N.Y., vol 4, tit. 9, § 5-02(a)(2).

58. See id. § 5-02(b)(2)(v).
59. See id. § 5-02(e); see also CITY OF N.Y. MAYOR'S OFFICE OF CONTRACTS,
VENDOR INFORMATION EXCHANGE SYSTEM (VENDEX): POLICIES AND PROC. MANUAL

(revised Jan. 1992) [hereinafter VENDEX MANUAL].
60. RULES OF THE CITY OF N.Y., vol. 4, tit. 9, § 5-02(e) (1994); see also CITY OF
N.Y. MAYOR'S OFF. OF CONTRACTS, VENDOR INFORMATION EXCHANGE SYSTEM
(VENDEX): BUSINESS ENTITY QUESTIONNAIRE (revised Jan. 1992) [hereinafter
VENDEX BuSINESS QUESTIONNAIRE]; CITY OF N.Y. MAYOR'S OFFICE OF CONTRACTS,
VENDOR INFORMATION EXCHANGE SYSTEM (VENDEX): PRINCIPAL QUESTIONNAIRE
(revised Jan. 1992).
61. Douglas Feiden, New Turn of PhraseScares Off Vendors, CRAIN's N.Y. Bus.,
Mar. 2, 1992, at 3, 24.
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Board

of

* been denied a contract despite being a low bidder or as
a result of an administrative action by any administrative
agency?
* been suspended or otherwise declared ineligible by any
government agency?
Has this business or any subsidiary of this business, or any
current or former directors, principals, officers, or managerial
employees of this business, either before or during their
employment:
* have any felony charges pending?
* have any misdemeanor charges pending?
" been convicted, after trial or plea, of a felony in the
past 10 years?
* been convicted, after trial or plea, of a misdemeanor
in the past 5 years?62
An affirmative answer to any of these questions is likely to be
disqualifying.'
VENDEX must by law include all convictions, indictments,
debarments, cautions and findings of non-responsibility that have been
entered against public contractors, their owners, and their high-level
employees.' The original idea was to include data bearing on the future
performance and integrity of contractors (for example, those contractors
who had defaulted on a previous public contract).
However, the only
information consistently entered into the database is whether a company
has been either debarred from all City contracts or found non-responsible
by one or more agencies for fraud (in bidding, performance, or
certification as a minority-owned business enterprise) or declared a poor
62. VENDEX BusINEss QUESONNAIRE, supra note 60 (Questions 12, 19, & 20).
63. See N.Y. CrrY CHARTER ch. 13, § 335 (1994).
64. See N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE tit. 6, § 6-116.2(b)(i)(11), (22) (1994).
65. See A Ship Without a Captain, supra note 1, at 468 n.26.
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performer.' According to at least one jaundiced observer, rather than
ensuring that City contracts are awarded to competent, honest contractors,
in practice, "VENDEX is essentially blackballing legitimate companies
and adding reams of red tape and onerous paperwork."67
New York City Local Law 5 mandates that VENDEX contain
"cautions" for any firm or person who has been debarred by any
governmental entity and for firms alleged to be involved in criminal
activity as shown by "reports of . . . the New York State Organized
Crime Task Force."6 In 1992, the Comptroller and the Mayor's Office
of Contracts became co-administrators of VENDEX. 9 Under New York
City Comptroller Elizabeth Holtzman, who served from 1989 to 1993, the
Comptroller's staff pushed aggressively to expand the criteria and sources
for VENDEX cautions so that a wider variety of allegations,
investigations, and suspicious business relationships would be entered.7"
Before an agency formally awards a contract to a low bidder, it must
check the VENDEX computer system for cautions.7" A contractor with
a caution may be declared non-responsible without any agency
explanation.7
At the very least, a VENDEX caution will delay the
letting of a contract to a low bidder pending further investigation. I The
questionnaires may then be scrutinized for false or misleading statements
and inquiries directed to the Department of Investigation (DOI), a unique
quasi-law enforcement agency whose mission is investigating official
corruption and fraud against the City.74 Ironically, however, in order to
avoid jeopardizing its sources and investigations, the DOI is reluctant to
66. Even this limited information appears to be entered only sporadically. Therefore,
an agency cannot be sure that a contractor who gets a clean bill of health from VENDEX
has not actually been convicted of fraud or other crimes.
VENDEX is only as good as the information entered into its database and there is
reason to believe that mistakes are not rare. In several cases, names of companies were
entered into VENDEX by clerical personnel simply because they appeared in an
investigation file. Such entries were made without any analysis of context much less any
application of formal criteria defining "morally irresponsible" or "corrupt."
67. Feiden, supra note 61, at 3.
68. See N.Y., N.Y., Local Law 5 (Jan. 18, 1991) (amending N.Y. CITY ADMIN.
CODE tit. 6, § 6-116.2(b)(i)(1 1), (18) which deals with creating a computerized database
to monitor contractors doing business with New York City).
69. See VENDEX MANUAL, supra note 59.
70. See generally N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE tit. 6, § 6-116.2(b)(i)(1)-(23) (1994).
71. VENDEX MANUAL, supra note 59, at 24.
72. Id.at31.
73. Id.at 32.
74. See RULES OF THE CITY OF N.Y., vol. 4, tit. 9, § 2-12(a) (1994).
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provide information about companies that are the direct or indirect targets
of its investigations or of investigations that are labelled pending, even if
inactive.
F. The Primacy of Integrity
If the agency's chief contracting officer believes the would-be
contractor is corrupt, or "irresponsible," the contract must be denied.75
The contractor can appeal to the agency head and, if unsuccessful, to the
Mayor.76 Even if the agency head judges the contractor morally
qualified to do business with the City, the Comptroller may object to and
temporarily delay the registration of the contract. 77 The Mayor may
reject the Comptroller's objection, but this must be done in writing, in
order 78to hold the Mayor's feet to the fire if a scandal should later
ensue.

Ultimately, agency officials and the Mayor must decide whether too
many doubts about a contractor's integrity have been raised. Such
decisions are fraught with political considerations. If the agency gives the
contractor the benefit of the doubt, it risks being excoriated by the media,
the Comptroller, law enforcement officials, and political opponents and
rivals. 79 It is understandable that risk-averse agency officials believe that
the safer course is to disqualify a contractor against whom there is any
negative entry in VENDEX or in the files or minds of DOI and its
investigators.
One contractor, who had previously done satisfactory work for the
Department of Housing, Preservation and Development, left unanswered
a question regarding subcontractor performance because no subcontractors
had been used.' As a result of this omission, the contractor received a
"U" or "unsatisfactory" designation on VENDEX.8" Because of the "U"
the contractor lost out on a $500,000 contract with the City.'
The
contractor's lawyer stated:
Now my client is branded. The nightmare becomes Kafkaesque.
He goes to another agency where he's worked for years and
75. Id. § 703(a).
76. Id.§ 7-03(c)(1), (4).

77. Id.§ 5-07(h).
78. Id. § 5-07(i)(2).
79.
80.
81.
82.

See VENDEX MANUAL, supra note 59, at 40-45.
Feiden, supra note 61, at 24.
Id.
Id.
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always got glowing reviews.
He's the low bidder on a
Department of General Services job. But then the "U" comes up
again on the computer. One black mark, and it's all over ...
VENDEX is like a virus, and now he's infected forever."
The operation of VENDEX illustrates the tension inherent in
regulating public contracting. On the one hand, it aims to make a
contribution to more efficient contracting by identifying poor
performers.' On the other hand, it makes integrity and the appearance
of integrity a higher priority than efficiency.8" Reflecting on the new
procurement system, a social services administrator said:
Before the charter changes, negotiated contracts were allowed
which gave us a good deal of flexibility. We had a very thorough
internal review procedure and responsibility was on me where it
belonged. After the new charter such arrangements were very

rare. 86
The current contracting system, substantially driven by the goals of the
anti-corruption project," overrides the judgment of the managers who
know contractors and the markets for various goods and services.

ml[.

THE COMPTROLLER'S OFFICE: THE QUEST
FOR CONTRACTOR INTEGRITY

In 1989, after voters approved the new City charter, the New York
City Comptroller's Office formed a special Contract Audit Unit to
determine the moral eligibility of prospective contractors. The Audit Unit
took its responsibility very seriously, seeking information on City
contractors from VENDEX, the School Construction Authority (SCA),
83. Id.
84. Id. at 3.
85. See Thomas D. Thacher II, Institutional Innovation in Controlling Organized
Crime, in ORGANIZED CRIME AND ITS CONTAINMENT: A TRANSATLANTIC INITIATIVE
169 (Cyrille Fijnaut & James B. Jacobs eds., 1991).
86. Anonymous interview.
87. By "anti-corruption project" we mean the laws, regulations and organizational
policies aimed at identifying, preventing and punishing official corruption. The term
"anti-corruption project" is not meant to imply a highly disciplined or coherent
movement. Rather, it represents a sporadic, cumulative effort over time by various
politicians and interest groups. See Frank Anechiarico & James B. Jacobs, Visions of
CorruptionControl & the Evolution ofAmerican PublicAdministration, 54 PUB. ADmIN.
REV. 465 (Sept./Oct. 1994).
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and federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. From 1990 to
1992, the Comptroller objected to dozens of contracts, primarily because
of the contractors' alleged organized crime ties, but in some cases because
of bad debts or having obtained a performance bond from a shady broker
or sham bonding company, a common fraud in the construction industry.
In one high-visibility case, Comptroller Holtzman persuaded the City
to rescind a contract held by a company run by Carmine Agnello, John
Gotti's son-in-law, to remove abandoned cars from Brooklyn streets.8"
According to Holtzman, the C & M Agnello Company and its owner "had
been implicated in a 'chop shop' operation [stripping down stolen cars]
in Queens and [Carmine Agnello] was under investigation for possible jury
tampering in an organized crime trial in Brooklyn involving Gotti's
brother, Gene. ""
Agnello employees, in (admittedly self-serving)
protests widely covered by the media, argued that they were engaged in
a legitimate business, that Agnello was on the job every day, and that the
company's employees were, in effect, being convicted and punished
without trial and for alleged offenses unrelated to whether they were
competently performing their City contract.
During the summer and fall of 1991, the Comptroller sparred with the
Department of Correction (DOC) in another high-visibility case over an
emergency jail construction contract that the DOC intended to sign with
the DeMatteis Construction Company.' ° The DOC asserted that the
contract did not need to be let by competitive bidding because of an
overcrowding emergency on Rikers Island. 9 The Comptroller disagreed,
criticizing the DOC for having entered into a contract with a company
whose president owned a majority interest in a concrete company that was
operated by the son-in-law of former Gambino Crime Family boss, Paul
Castellano. 2 The DOC argued that the Comptroller was risking a public
safety crisis by attacking the integrity of a company that had passed the
SCA's scrutiny. After the contract became an issue in the press, Mayor
David Dinkins canceled it and debarred the company from all City
88. Selwyn Raab, New York Halls Contract With Gotti Son-In-Law, N.Y. TIMEs,
Nov. 19, 1991, at B3.
89. Id.
90. In re DeMatteis Constr. Corp., N.Y. L.J., Oct. 16, 1992, at 22 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Oct. 15, 1992) [hereinafter DeMatteis 1, aff'd mem., DeMatteis Constr. Corp. v.
Dinkins, 594 N.Y.S.2d 167, 167 (1st Dep't 1993) [hereinafter DeMatteis Ill.
91. The controversy over the emergency jail construction contract is documented in
DeMatteis I, supra note 90; see also Richard Korman, News Construction Manager
Denies Ties to Mob, ENGNEERiNG NEws, Apr. 20, 1992, at 21.
92. See DeMatteis I, supra note 90.
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work.' DeMatteis sued the City claiming that the Comptroller's and
Mayor's determinations of non-responsibility were unfounded. 94 The

court agreed and held that "[o]ther than innuendo, speculation, and guilt
by association, particularly by one with an Italian surname, there is simply

no evidence of a probative value to show a link between [DeMatteis] and
underworld figures or a link between [DeMatteis] and corrupt activity."' 5
The City appealed and lost.' The appellate court, in affirming the lower
court decision, characterized the City's debarment as "arbitrary and

capricious."'
Comptroller Holtzman objected to numerous other contracts on
"integrity" grounds. In October, 1991, Holtzman urged Mayor David

Dinkins to overrule his chief procurement officer's decision to let a
contract to EMD Construction Corp., a construction firm which had failed

to report that it had once been investigated by the Occupational Safety and

Health Administration (OSHA) for a workplace safety violation.98 The

Mayor refused on the ground that an OSHA investigation is not the kind
of (corruption-type) investigation that must be reported to VENDEX.
Ultimately, Holtzman prevailed in her battle against EMD. In August,
1992 the Parks Department, urged on by Holtzman, canceled a contract
to repair the Orchard Beach Bathhouse roof."° The Parks Department
93.
94.
95.
96.

See id.
See id.
Id.
DeMatteis 11, supra note 90, at 167.
97. Id.
98. See Karen Freifeld, ParksDept. CancelsBathhouse Contract,N.Y. NEWSDAY,
Aug. 11, 1992, at 25.
99. N.Y. CrrT MAYOR'S OFFIcE OF CONTRACTS, N.Y. CrrY CHEF PROcuREmENT
OFFICER, DECISIONS REGARDING COMPTROLLER 328(c) OBJECTIONS AND APPEALS OF
AGENCY NON-REsPONslBILrIY DETERMINATIONS 29-34 (April 1993) (328(c) Objections
from 9/01/90 to 9/29/93) (reprinting the October 16, 1991 letter from Michael C.
Rogers, Director of the Mayor's Office of Contracts, to Comptroller Elizabeth Holtzman
explaining why the Mayor's office disagreed with the Comptroller's objections)
[hereinafter COMPTROLLER OBJECTIONS].
The New York City Charter provides that all procurement contracts must be filed
with the City Comptroller. N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 13, § 328 (a) (1994). The City
Comptroller, however, has the right to file an objection to any contract, and unless the
Mayor responds to the Comptroller's objections in writing, the contract cannot be
implemented. See id. § 328 (c). If the Mayor does respond in writing and describes any
corrective actions that will be taken in light of the Comptroller's objections or gives the
reasons why the Mayor disagrees with the Comptroller, then the Comptroller is required
to register and implement the contract. Id.
100. Freifeld, supra note 98, at 25.
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claimed that EMD "has a long history of unsatisfactory business
integrity," including failing to pay taxes owed the City, violating labor
laws, defaulting on a Transit Authority contract, and failing to disclose
that "it was integrally connected to Atlantic Contracting Corporation,
another contractor deemed a 'non-responsible bidder'" 0 1
In another case, Holtzman challenged the award of a contract for
paving work because the firm, Yonkers Contracting Company, had been
indicted, although acquitted, of bid-rigging in Westchester County and at
the time the contract was pending was a defendant in a civil suit based on
similar allegations."w She also objected to doing business with HHM
Associates based on its failure to report OSHA violations and to file and
pay federal, state and city taxes on time.I Holtzman also alleged that
HHM was a "front" for Carl Capasso, a convicted tax evader." °4 In still
another case, Holtzman attempted to block a New York State Department
of Transportation repair contract with John C. Picone, Inc. because of
alleged mob ties to the Luchese and Colombo crime families. 1°
Although the state, not New York City, awarded the contract, Holtzman
claimed that her objection was proper because the project was partially
funded by the City." 6 Holtzman stated that, "[n]o City money should
go to contractors of questionable integrity." 7
The current trend is unmistakable. For contractors wishing to do
business with New York City, character and integrity are now
relevant."18 Would-be contractors must fully disclose personal and
company finances: thus the VENDEX database is expanding. 109 Dozens
of City agencies and independent authorities are investigating would-be
City contractors and making independent judgments about whether they
are honest enough.110 A negative determination by any agency casts a
shadow over the company's future as a City contractor since agency heads
want to avoid media criticism for doing business with "racketeers" who
101. Id.
102. Richard Korman, New York City Clarifies What is Corruption Tat Bars
Contractors, ENGINEERING NEws-RECORD, June 29, 1992, at 21.
103. COMPTROLLER OBJECTIONS, supra note 99, at 49.
104. Kevin Flynn, Holtzman Blocks Sewer Contracts, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Feb. 26,
1992, at 24.
105. Mitchell Moss, Shaky Foundations,N.Y. NEWSDAY, Feb. 8, 1993, at 23.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See Feiden, supranote 61, at 3.
109. See id. at 24.
110. See id. at3.
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have been disqualified by other government agencies.'

A single

agency's favorable finding, however, will not qualify a firm to do business
with every City agency because each agency (and the Comptroller) is
responsible for making its own responsibility determination." 2
IV. THE SCHOOL CONSTRUCTION AUTHORITY RATCHETS THE
INTEGRITY PROJECT ONE STEP FURTHER

A. The School Construction Authority Model"3
The law enforcement community has sought to enlist the assistance of

City agencies in the war against organized crime by denying public
contracts to firms that are owned or strongly influenced by Cosa
Nostra." 4'
The School Construction Authority's organization and

operation 15indicates the direction in which the anti-corruption project is
evolving.
Corruption was uppermost in the minds of those who created the SCA

to take over the Board of Education's school renovation and building

program." 6
SCA's founders were determined not to have the
multi-billion dollar school construction effort derailed by the kind of
corruption scandals that had afflicted the Board of Education's building
111. Id.at 24.
112. See RULES OF THE CITY OF N.Y., vol. 4, tit. 9, § 2-05(a) (1994).
113. For an in-depth description of the SCA's anti-corruption efforts, see Thomas
D. ThacherIl, Combatting CorruptionAndRacketeering: A New Strategy ForReforming
Public ContractingIn New York City's Construction Industry, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
113 (1995).
114. See NEW YORK STATE ORGANIZED CRIME TASK FORCE, CORRUPTION AND
RACKETEERING IN THE N.Y. CITY CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY: FINAL REP. TO GoV.
MARIO M. Cuomo (1989) [hereinafter TASK FORCE FINAL REP.] (describing in detail
the Cosa Nostra's racketeering and bid-rigging schemes in New York City's construction
contracting system and suggesting procedures to eliminate it). See also JAMES B. JACOBS
ET AL, BUSTING THE MOB: U.S. V. COSA NOSTRA (1994).
115. Thomas D. Thacher II, currently the Inspector General and a Vice-President
of the New York City School Construction Authority, has spearheaded these efforts. Mr.
Thacher participated in the symposium sponsored by the New York Law School Law
Review in conjunction with the New York Law School Center for New York City Law
on March 30, 1995 entitled Police Corruption, Municipal Corruption: Cures at What
Cost?
116. See Thacher, supra note 85, at 169-82.
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program." 7 Therefore, the SCA included a state-of-the-art inspector
As inspector general and vice
general's office with a staff of sixty.'
president, the SCA's Board of Directors appointed Thomas Thacher II,
formerly head of the New York State Organized Crime Task Force's
initiative against corruption and racketeering in the New York City
construction industry.' 19 Thaeher moved aggressively to protect the
SCA's $4.3 billion construction program from the taint of corruption by
implementing, among other strategies, a prequalification procedure for
would-be contractors." 2 The first step in the prequalification process
for would-be contractors was a 30-page questionnaire which, among other
things, asks:
In the past ten years has the applicant firm, or any of its current
or past key people or affiliate firms . . . taken the Fifth
Amendment in testimony regarding a business related crime?...
given or offered to give money or any other benefit to a labor
official or public servant with intent to influence that labor official
or public servant with respect to any of his or her official acts,
duties or decisions as a labor official
... [or] agreed with
2
another to bid below the market rate?1 '
Penalties for a false answer include disqualification from bidding on SCA
contracts and criminal prosecution for providing false information to a
government agency.'2 As part of the prequalification process, the SCA
has adopted a stringent forfeiture policy."Z Prequalification forms must
be signed by all principals of the firm so that, in the event of a false or
misleading answer regarding criminal activity, all payments to the
117. See id.; see also N.Y. SENATE COMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, TAXATION, AND
GOV'T OPERATIONS, SCH. FOR SCANDAL: A STAFF REPORT ON THE N.Y. CITY BOARD
OF EDUCATION'S MISMANAGEMENT OF SCH. CONSTRUCTION, REPAIR AND RENOVATION

(1987).
118. See Thacher, supra note 85, at 169-82.
119. See Today's News, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 19, 1989, at 1.
120. See Thacher, supra note 85, at 180-81.
121. N.Y. STATE SCH. CONSTR. AUTH.,
CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTORS 26-29 (1990).

PREQUALIFICATION APPLICATION:

122. Feiden, supra note 61, at 21.
123. See Selwyn Raab, 52 CompaniesBannedfromSchool ConstructionBids, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 27, 1991, at Bi.
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contractor, even for work legitimately and competently performed, must
be returned to the SCA.1"
An example of this type of a forfeiture action occurred in a case
involving The New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) and a
contractor, Hi-Tech Mechanical, Inc. In 1992, NYCHA awarded Hi-Tech
a contract for plumbing and other repairs at a Bronx housing project.
Although no questions were raised about the competency of Hi-Tech's
previous work for NYCHA and the Sanitation Department, Councilwoman
Carolyn Maloney, chair of the City Council's Subcommittee on Contracts,
urged NYCHA to reconsider its award. 11
When three Hi-Tech
directors were indicted by a federal grand jury for money laundering,
NYCHA moved to terminate all Hi-Tech contracts. 1" NYCHA took the
position that all money owed to Hi-Tech for services rendered should be
withheld and that $9.6 million previously paid to the firm for completed
work should be returned not because the company failed in performing its
contractual obligations, but because it engaged in criminal activities."1r
In August, 1991, Thacher announced that the SCA was disqualifying,
for up to five years, more than fifty construction firms." Nearly half
the SCA's disqualifications were based on purported mob ties or
criminality, not on past poor performance on government contracts or
inability to perform future contracts." 2 Even more novel, the SCA
requires some contractors, whose integrity is in doubt, to hire independent
investigative auditing firms as a condition precedent to getting SCA work.
The consulting firm's task is to implement an in-house corruption
prevention program, including a code of business ethics for the contractor,
and to monitor the contractor's compliance with both the program and the
code. The SCA requires the consulting firm to report to both the
contractor's top management and to the SCA's inspector general." z
124. Interview with Thomas Thacher, II, SCA Inspector General (Apr. 25, 1991);
see N.Y. Crry SCH. CONSTR. AUTH., MANUAL OF POL'Y AND PROC., at CA-1 to CA-4
(describing the contract administration procedure of the School Construction Authority).
125. Selwyn Raab, Housing Agency ContractorNamed in FraudIndictment, N.Y.
TlIEs, Feb. 28, 1992, at B3.
126. Id.

127. Id.
128. Raab, supra note 123, at B4.
129. See id. at Bi. Francis X. McArdle, Managing Director of the New York City
General Contractors Association, warned against arbitrary action by contracting agencies
and called for the creation of an appeals board to protect contractors from the use of
"subjective reasons" in the exclusion of bidders. Id.
130. See New York City Sch. Constr. Auth., Off. of Inspector Gen., Discussion
Notes of Meeting of the Board of Trustees, Mar. 2, 1995 (copy on file with the New
York Law School Law Review).
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V. IMPLICATIONS OF ANTI-CORRUPTION EFFORTS FOR PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION IN NEW YORK CITY

The negative impacts on public administration of the competitive
lowest responsible bidder system, the principal anti-corruption strategy for
public contracting, although much written about, are difficult to
exaggerate. 131 By removing the public official's discretion over choice
of contractor, competitive bidding eliminates the official's ability to obtain
superior goods and services, especially for construction projects. 32 In
effect, the City does not choose its contractors; the contractors choose
themselves by their bids. Not surprisingly, the quality of goods and
services suffers.133 Less obviously, costs are not necessarily controlled
nor completion promoted.
A. Poor Quality of ContractorPerformance
Under the lowest responsible bidder method, contracts are awarded
according to lowest cost, not performance record. Even a contractor who
does a shoddy job must be awarded future contracts if it is the lowest
bidder, unless it is found non-responsible. Consequently, many firms with
terrible performance records continue to win City contracts. Several City
officials told us that they knew that they were going to get shoddy, even
fraudulent, work from certain contractors but felt powerless to do anything
about it:
The feeling is that under current rules, disqualification of a
contractor for bad performance is too heavy a penalty. Contract
officials think, 'who will defend me in court when contractors sue
when they're called poor performers?' The charter revision
fought the last war-the PVB scandal. It doesn't address the
problem of performance."
The Comptroller's 1990 investigative report on Diversified Products
of New York, Ltd., illustrates how an incompetent and unscrupulous
contractor can continue to obtain City contracts despite an appalling
performance record. The report documents how, over a seven-year period,
131. For a trenchant critique of the competitive lowest responsible bidder system
and suggestions for its reform, see STEVEN KELMAN, PROCUREMENT AND PUBLIC
MANAGEMENT:

THE FEAR OF DISCRETION AND

PERFORMANCE (1990).

132. See id.
133. See id.
134. Anonymous interview.

THE QUALITY OF GOVERNMENT

1995]

PURGING CORRUPTION

Diversified Products and other companies owned by the same principals
repeatedly failed to perform adequately under their contracts, and in some
cases failed to perform at all. Despite having been cajoled, threatened and
even declared non-responsible by one City agency, Diversified and its
predecessor company continued to win numerous contracts. As the report
observes:
This is a case study of official indifference and the costs of that
indifference to New York City taxpayers. This interim report
reveals that several apparently unscrupulous contractors have
obtained millions of dollars from the City's treasury over a seven
and one half year period despite a contemporaneously-documented
pattern of their poor performance, their35 failure of performance,
and their persistent misrepresentations.
The secondary and tertiary effects of the competitive bidding system
can also be dysfunctional: indeed, they go a long way toward explaining
New York City's difficulty in completing public works. First, many
quality contractors refuse to bid on public projects because they cannot
compete with politically-savvy but poorly-performing contractors who
know how to manipulate the system by bidding low and then piling on
costs through (questionable) change orders. 1" Second, many contractors
refuse to subject themselves to the red tape and onerous VENDEX
questionnaires. 137 Third, some contractors who do bid on City jobs have
138
become cynical and rationalize shoddy work and dishonest practices.
Finally, competitive bidding may have reduced corruption at the contract
39
letting stage only to increase fraud at the contract performance stage.
The low bidder may feel justified in doing everything possible to enhance
its remuneration by manufacturing costly change orders.
The Kings County Hospital construction fiasco is a good example of
the problems that beset the contracting system. " In 1984, the City
embarked on a $1 billion project to build a new hospital in an
135. N.Y. CITY OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER, SECOND INTERIM REP. ON
DIVERSIFIED PRODUCTS OF NEhv YORK, LTD. (1990).
136. See A Ship Without a Captain, supra note 1, at 472.
137. See id. at 474.
138. See id. at 480-81.
139. Id. at 481.
140. See William Bunch et al., Costly Oops: Bid FiascoJustLatest Hospital Woe,
N.Y. NEmvsDAY, Feb. 19, 1994, at 3.
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impoverished Brooklyn neighborhood.14 1 Ten years and $119 million
later, the New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation (HHC) had an
administrative building, a food service building, a couple of holes in the
ground and a few parking spots.142 This debacle led to a fusillade of
accusations and criticism from the community's political leaders and the
Mayor. 1" Luis A. Miranda, Jr., chair of the HHC Board of Directors,
acknowledged that his agency (but not his administration) had "completely
screwed up."'"
Notwithstanding this confession, he blamed the
construction managers, Turner/Santa Fe, for not properly discharging their
responsibilities.145
Santa Fe, chosen in 1987 to jointly manage the huge project with
Turner Construction Company, encountered continuous problems,
including faulty architectural plans and difficulties in finding qualified
minority subcontractors."' Gerry Rizzi, a former project supervisor for
Turner Construction, stated, "We did everything we could. Seven days
a week, 14 hour days. It was a never ending battle. The problem is the
system and the system doesn't work."147 In April, 1992, for instance,
Turner/Santa Fe awarded an excavation contract to the second-lowest
bidder because the lowest bidder did not properly complete the necessary
paperwork.'" The lowest bidder then sued the City and was awarded the
contract only to be fired ten-months later when the agency discovered that
the subcontractor failed to report its criminal record. After a nineteen
month delay, the contract was finally awarded to the third-lowest
bidder.14 9 Despite repeated warnings from Coopers & Lybrand, an
independent auditing firm, that Turner/Sinta Fe was mismanaging the
project, HHC approved a $16 million supplement to the management
company's original $19 million, bid." 5
141. David Firestone, New York Hospitals Chief Calls Brooklyn Plan a Giant
Failure, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 11, 1994, at Al.
142. Id.
143. Alan Finder, Managing to Fail: How a Hospital Wasn't Built, N.Y. TIMnS,
Apr. 3, 1994, at Al.
144. Firestone, supra note 141, at Al.
145. Id. at B2.
146. David Firestone, ManagerSays New YorkLet HospitalFail,N.Y. TIMEs, Feb.
12, 1994, at B21, B22.
147. Bunch et al., supra note 140, at 3.
148. Firestone, supra note 146, at B22.
149. Id.
150. Wendel Jamieson, HHC Defers $16M Extra Payout to Contractor, N.Y.
NEWSDAY, May 29, 1992, at 21.
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Meanwhile, conflict of interest allegations arose concerning three
contracts worth $2.5 million awarded by HHC to Darryl E. Greene &
Associates."' The first contract was awarded in 1988 despite its being
a high bid; the third and most recent contract was obtained without a
competitive bid.152 It was alleged that Greene was a law partner of
Assemblyman Clarence Norman, Jr., a supporter of the Kings County
Hospital project.5
B. Public Contracting in Crisis
The New York State Commission on Government Integrity, which
was created in 1987 by Governor Mario M. Cuomo to investigate
corruption by city and state officials, recognized that the corruption
controls imposed on City procurement are crippling the contracting
process." Its scathing report, A Ship Without A Captain: The
Contracting Process in New York City, began with this blunt assessment:
The problems facing New York City's contracting system have
reached a state of crisis, no less real and no less serious than the
more conspicuous problems facing the City. A twelve-month
review has convinced this Commission that the City's labyrinthine
contracting system wastes millions of taxpayer dollars-dollars
which otherwise could be spent fighting crime, drug abuse, and
homelessness. It is mired in red tape, scares away vendors and
remains vulnerable to corruption. 55
The Commission examined 798 competitively bid Human Resources
Administration (HRA) service contracts (accounting for 75% of the dollar
value of all HRA contracts) and found that 49% of these contracts were
151. James C. McKinley Jr., Payments to Consulting FirmFrozen in Kings Hospital
Work, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1994, at B24.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. A Ship Without a Captain, supra note 1, at 480-81. The New York State
Commission on Government Integrity is also known as the Feerick Commission, after
its chairperson, Fordham Law School dean, John D. Feerick.
155. ld. at 461. Just three years earlier, the State-City Commission on Integrity in
Government (the Sovern Commission) reviewed the City's contracting problems and
warned that failure to address fragmentation and complexity of contracting operations
was an open invitation to corruption. See STATE-CITY COMM'N ON INTEGRITY IN
GOV'T, REP. AND RECOMMENDATIONS RELATING TO CITY PRocUREMENT AND
CONTRACTS 67 (1986).
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awarded with fewer than a bare minimum of three bids.'56 "HRA was
unable to attract more than two bids for a wide range of services. For
instance, only two vendors bid on a $5.2 million contract to provide
cooked meals for the homeless in City shelters, although 30 companies
had been invited to bid."1 57
The same pattern appears throughout City government. "All too often,
the City is faced with a small number of 'niche' bidders, firms whose
expertise lies in threading their way through the City contracting maze and
who have adapted themselves to its peculiar and confounding logic."''
The Commission stressed the overall negative impact of layer upon layer
of checks, balances, and anti-corruption reforms and summarized the bleak
state of the City contracting process:
The problems of the City's contracting system have been
compounded by the City's reaction to municipal corruption
scandals which began to unfold in late 1985 and early 1986. As
a result, the contracting process has been saddled with an ever
increasing burden of paperwork requiring review and approval by
many different oversight agencies.
To be sure, each added layer of oversight originates in
well-intentioned response to a particular scandal or crisis.
Together, however, 'they add up to a blueprint for paralysis.
Instead of a clear vision of what constitutes good contracting
practice, the City has pieced together a patchwork of checkpoints
and barriers. Their cumulative effect is to slow the City's
business to a crawl and to deter vendors from bidding on City
business. 159
The Commission made five recommendations for improving the City
contracting system. First, the City should place increased emphasis on
attracting more contractors, rather than identifying bad contractors."
Second, the Mayor should appoint a temporary deputy mayor whose sole
responsibility would be to oversee and reform City contracting.""
Third, each agency should appoint a chief contracting officer with a
156. A Ship Without a Captain, supra note 1, at 470.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 471.
at 472.
at 469.
at 464.

161. Id. at 464-65.
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professional procurement background. 62 Fourth, the City must train
contracting personnel so they have "the skills and the tools necessary to
get the best possible deal for the City."'" Finally, in order to cut down
on delay, the City should review contracts on "a selective post-audit
basis" after they are awarded, rather than before, to make sure City
contracting rules are followed." 4
Costs tend to swell during City projects; final project costs bear little
resemblance to the original bid price. Many construction contractors who
bid low to obtain a City contract try to hold the City as closely as possible
to the original contract specifications. For any deviation from the
specifications, contractors request "change orders" that result in an
increase to the final contract price. Disputes over change orders can lead
to contractors walking off the job and to work stoppages. They also
generate opportunities for project managers to solicit or accept bribes. 16
In a 1987 report, the Institute for Public Administration (IPA) stated:
The fallacies of low bid restrictions in complex projects have
been proven nationwide time and again. Managers involved in
contractor selection must develop the skills and must be
encouraged to exercise the discretion to weigh low bids against
realistically estimated costs, against the quality and past
performance of a potential contractor, against the needs for
innovation and flexibility in implementation. New York's ratio of
change orders to original bids is high. In the case studies, the IPA
did not find much awareness of how final project costs related to
original bids. Nor was anyone reviewing the relationship between
various contract selection methods and project results."
Change order disputes do not end with the completion of the job. 67
Construction projects spawn lawsuits by contractors challenging the denial
of requests for change orders. 6' A small bar of specialty lawyers,
162. Id. at 465.
163. Id.
164. Id.

165. See INST. FOR PuB. ADMIN., CONTRACTING IN
RECOMMENDATIONS (1987).

N.Y. CrrY:

FINAL REP. AND

166. Id. at 38.
167. See Feiden, supra note 61, at 3 (noting that a cottage industry of lawyers has
arisen to deal with the New York City's contract procurement procedures); see also A
Ship Without a Captain, supranote 1, at 488-90 (describing the need for anti-corruption
measures after a contract has been awarded to a particular contractor).
168. See Feiden, supra note 61, at 3.
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operating on a contingent-fee basis, represent contractors in post-project
litigation.)
Given the City's frequent inability to defend its
specifications and project management competently, these lawyers rely on
their ability to force the City into lucrative settlements."
The City
charges that much of this litigation is frivolous.171
In recent years the City has tried to anticipate post-project lawsuits by
inserting protective clauses into its construction contracts." One of the
most controversial of these provides that in the event of delays caused by
the City (a frequent claim made by contractors), the contractor is not
entitled to any monetary damages." This clause outrages contractors,
who argue that dilatory City decisionmaking imposes serious, sometimes
devastating, costs. 74 The use of the clause compounds their disrespect,
cynicism, and possibly their proclivity to cheat the City.
The organized crime ties or associations of many construction
contractors only makes the relationship between public employer and
public contractor more complex. Historically, mob-dominated construction
unions have established and enforced employer cartels which assign
contracts and dictate prices.175 Any company foolhardy enough to
challenge the system found itself without workers or under constant threat
of sabotage.' 76
The negative effects flowing from the competitive bidding system
snowball. The perception that greedy, dishonest contractors are poised to
exploit any contractual or managerial opportunity to defraud the City has
led to more oversight, double checks, stringent contract terms, slow
payments, and lately, the screening of contractors for integrity. In turn,
this leads to increased cynicism among contractors who feel that they are
treated like quasi-criminals, and provides them a rationalization for further
dubious practices, This, in turn, is likely to spawn more safeguards and
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. John Grubin, "No-Damage-For-Delay" Clauses: Fair or Foul?-The Owner's
Perspective 6 (1988) (unpublished paper presented at the Fourth Annual Meeting of the
American Bar Association Forum Committee on the Construction Industry in Tampa,
Flordia on April 28-29, 1988) (on file with the New York Law SchoolLaw Review); see
also, James P. Griffin & John F. Grubin, Kalisch-Jarcho-SimpleApplications of Old
Principles, N.Y. L.J., May 12, 1983, at 1.
174. A Ship Without a Captain, supra note 1, at 473-80.

175. TASK FORCE FINAL REP., supra note 114, at 37-51.
176. Id. at 30, 45-51 (describing several specific instances of sabotage and its effect
on the contract bargaining process).
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greater suspicion. One City Council staffer told us that in her opinion "all
contractors are crooks." 177 It is hard to see how the City could
effectively carry out desperately needed capital construction and competent
service delivery while operating under such an assumption.
In such a grim situation, one of the only ways that crucial public
works can proceed is by turning them over to public authorities (e.g., the
Port Authority, Dormitory Authority, Urban Development Corporation,
School Construction Authority), which are not constrained to the same
extent as City agencies by the rules that govern City contracting. 78
Again the irony-reformed and sanitized so that it is corruption-proof, fair
and equitable public administration has become unworkable. Essential
responsibilities have to be farmed out to public authorities. These
authorities, however, are not immune from the pressures to fight
corruption." Therefore, they are also in danger of succumbing to the
same administrative disease.
VI. ARE CORRUPTION AND RACKETEERING DowN?
Unfortunately, it is virtually impossible to determine whether the
anti-corruption reforms embedded in public contracting have reduced
corruption. Because corruption is generally a secret crime, there are no
data with which to compare corruption rates over time."m True,
historians of nineteenth and early-twentieth century New York paint a
picture of pervasive corruption in which some politicians were openly
contemptuous of law and integrity."I Today's corrupt politicians are
not so openly contemptuous, but modern corruption scandals reveal a good
deal of contemptuousness. Operation "Double Steel," an FBI sting
operation, conducted from 1985 to 1987 in municipalities and counties
throughout New York State, revealed pervasive corruption in procurement
177. Anonymous interview.
178. Compare James C. McKinley, Jr., Banned Unit of Lockheed May Get Pact,
N.Y. TIMIEs, Nov. 22, 1994, at B1, B4 and Larry Olmstead, 2 Managers Held in
Bidding Scheme at School Agency, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1993, at Al, B9 with Alan
Finder, Mismanagement is Found in Youth Agency Grants, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 22, 1995,
at B3.
179. N.Y. STATE COMM'N ON GOV'T INTEGRITY, Underground Government:
PreliminaryReport on Authorities & Other PublicCorporations,in GOvERNMENTETHICS
REFORM FOR THE 1990s, at 340, 378 (1991).
180. John T. Noonan, Bribes, excerpted in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME & JUSTICE,
at 119, 123 (1983).
181. See, e.g., sources cited in supra note 13.
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and contracting." Forty-four New York municipal officials, including
highway superintendents, parks managers, and public works
commissioners from forty towns outside New York City were approached
by undercover agents posing as vendors of snowplow blades, street signs
and other products." s Of 106 bribe and kickback offers, 105 were
accepted."
The one rejected bribe was refused because it was too
small!"
Even if it somehow could be shown that payoffs, kickbacks, and selfdealing have declined over the twentieth century, they nonetheless remain
a basic feature of urban life in New York City and other cities. And the
regulatory reforms put in place to achieve that reduction (if it is a
reduction) have generated their own corruption vulnerabilities. There has
probably been an increase over time in the amount of fraud against the
government. In part, contractor fraud is a consequence of policies that
have produced a dysfunctional relationship between the City and
contractors who know how to exploit a labyrinthine, suspicion-ridden, and
inefficient contracting system.
Several examples illustrate the persistent nature of corruption in the
contracting process. Since the 1960s, extensive corruption has been
revealed in the granting and administration of human services
contracts. 8 6
There are numerous examples of human services
contractors billing the City for services that have not been provided, for
costs that were not incurred, and for treating patients who did not
exist. 1
In another area, inspectors general told the New York State Organized
Crime Task Force that they believe there is significant fraud on every
182. Ralph Blumenthal, FBI Says Public Officials Accepted 105 of 106 Bribes
Offered in 2-year Operation, N. Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1987, at Al, B4.
183. Id. at Al.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. See, e.g., Ralph Blumenthal, Companies Cited in Payoffs for Co-op Work are
Named, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1994, at B3; Alan Finder, Dangerous Parking, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 11, 1993, at AS; George E. Jordan & Mitch Gelman, PVB Mess:
Breakdown of Scrutiny; Lockheed slipped through DOI's Screening Oversight, N.Y.
NEWSDAY, Aug. 29, 1993, at 6; Kevin McCoy, Firm, 4 Execs To Be Indicted, N.Y.
NEWSDAY, Nov. 7, 1991, at 5; Richard Perez-Pena, Investigators Ask: Did Lockheed
Clean House?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 1993, at B9; Selwyn Raab, 52 Companies Banned
from School ConstructionBids, N.Y. TiMEs, Aug. 27, 1991, at BI; see also George J.
Jordan, Privatizing Isn't Always Improving City Services, N.Y. NEVSDAY, Dec. 30,
1993, at 35 (noting then Mayor-elect Rudolph Giuliani's plan to privatize several major
city services in an attempt to combat corruption and cut costs).
187. See sources cited in supra note 186.
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major construction project. 8 ' Nevertheless, the City has no way to
quantify the extent (either in frequency or magnitude) to which it has been
defrauded. In 1981, for example, the State Commission on Investigation
received allegations of fraud and corruption in the multi-million dollar
repair program in Co-op City, a state-financed 15,000-unit housing
complex in the Bronx.'89 The Commission's hearings, held between
1981 and 1983, revealed widespread corruption."9 The Commission
found that "prior to October, 1981 there was widespread abuse
characterized by mismanagement, waste and corruption and that
subsequent to October, 1981, progress in accomplishing repairs ...
virtually ceased.""' Non-competitively bid emergency contracts were
awarded at costs much greater than competitive rates.' 92 Inspections
193
were inadequate, and contractors' payments were not audited.
As a result of the Commission's final report, twenty people were
indicted and sixteen convicted."9 George Steiner, the general manager
of the Co-op City construction repair program was convicted of extortion
and tax evasion involving more than $1.2 million in kickbacks and bribes
received from contractors. 5 The following letter, filed with Steiner's
sentencing, provides a telling commentary on the extent of corruption in
public works:
George Steiner took advantage of an environment at Co-op City
which was an incubator for corruption. The State did not provide
adequate resources to protect the expenditure of its money. The
[Co-op City] Board of Directors, management and professional
advisors were more interested in spending State funds first and
later determining whether the expenditures were appropriate. The
total lack of effective controls over state funds which were used
to pay for construction defects permitted contractors to make a
fortune even after having made payoffs to Steiner and others.'1

188. TASK FORCE FINAL REP., supra note 114, at 13.
189. See STATE OF N.Y. COMM'N ON INVESTIGATION, THE Co-OP CnTY REPAIR
PROGRAM 1-15 (1983) (describing the background to the scandal and how it surfaced).
190. ld.
191. Id. at 3.
192. TASK FORCE FINAL REP., supra note 114, at 110-11 (describing the Co-Op
City repair corruption scandal).
193. Id.
194. ld.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 111.
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Implicit in the effort to exclude corrupt contractors is the belief that
denying public contracts to mob-influenced firms will weaken the financial
base of organized crime and ultimately its power. Further, mobilizing
government contracting to aid law enforcement is based on the belief that
threatening to deny contractors a significant portion of their business will
deter them from dealing with racketeers. These assumptions must be
carefully examined.
It is not easy to eliminate mob-influenced or otherwise non-responsible
companies from government contracting.
The New York City
construction industry is a tough industry. Scrupulous firms have long ago
been driven away or voluntarily departed. Those who now bid regularly
on City contracts have learned how to make money in dealing with the
City and its arcane contracting rules. They also have learned how to deal
with corrupt building inspectors, incompetent site supervisors,
mob-dominated labor unions, and, in some cases, dangerous crime-ridden
neighborhoods. Whether these firms can be purged from the field and, if
so, whether ethically responsible firms will replace them remains to be
seen.
Debarred companies can and have continued to bid on government
contracts under different corporate identities and through different officers
(fronts without criminal records) or as subcontractors. It is extremely
difficult to prove that a new firm is the alter ego of one previously
excluded.
There is no hope of excluding mob-influenced firms without extensive,
expensive, and time-consuming investigation and monitoring. While there
are no systematic cost figures on the exclusion process, the SCA has
generated some rough estimates based on lengthy questionnaires and
investigations of approximately 3500 contractors over a five-year
period.1" Investigating a typical applicant costs approximately $2000;
a complex case can reach $10,000. '" If the same kind of effort was
implemented across all City agencies (and there is reason to believe that
nothing less would be adequate), the costs would probably be prohibitive
and the process would certainly increase the crippling delays that already
plague the contracting process.
Costs are also generated by penalizing and/or barring contractors who
are doing or have done acceptable work, but are under suspicion of
racketeering activity." 9 Even if policymakers determined that these
197. Thacher, supra note 113, at 133.
198. Interviews with Joseph DeLuca, Assistant Inspector General, New York City
School Construction Authority, in New York, N.Y. (Sept. 25, 1991 & Nov. 18, 1991).
Investigation costs are adapted from private sector estimates.
199. See Thacher, supra note 113, at 134 (pointing out the costs associated with
canceling a partially performed contract).
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costs were worth bearing in order to weaken organized crime, protect the
City from fraud, and maintain "purity" in contractual relations, it is
hardly clear that such a policy would work. The argument that legitimate
businesses will be deterred from becoming involved with racketeers if
their public contracts are at risk assumes that contractors have substantial
freedom to enter and exit such relationships and that, if properly
motivated, they can resist the racketeers. In many cases-and the New
York City construction market is a good example-contractors have had
no real option to refuse to deal with mobsters and racketeers. Failure to
cooperate has meant being put out of business by mob-influenced labor
unions that can bring a contractor to his knees by withholding labor,
fomenting labor unrest, or sabotaging his project.'
VII. CONCLUSION
Public officials must strike a delicate balance when formulating
contracting policy. On one hand, public contracts must be carefully
monitored lest the City be defrauded by corrupt public officials and
contractors. On the other hand, the contracting system must be efficient
and flexible in providing goods and services. Unfortunately, it is difficult
to determine which anti-corruption controls in public contracting, if any,
prevent corruption. In fact, many contracting laws and other reforms put
into place over the years have themselves increased corruption
vulnerabilities. When the drive to prevent corruption in public contracting
is not carefully considered, it makes the implementation of public works
and the delivery of public services even more difficult and costly.
Each fiscal year, New York City expends about one-fourth of its
budget on contracts with private-sector suppliers of goods and services.
Such a vast amount of money dispersed in thousands of ad hoc
transactions presents innumerable opportunities for corruption. The City's
main defense against fraud is competitive bidding, which was originally
aimed at preventing City officials from accepting or extorting kickbacks
in exchange for sweetheart contracts. This system has not stopped the
200. Meyer S. Frucher, former President of the Battery Park City Authority, was
able to save several million dollars in construction costs by using a labor consultant who
persuaded the Teamsters on the job to forego their usual gateway charges on non-union
haulers. It turned out later that the labor consultant had been acquitted of a gangland
murder. Frucher's achievement in completing the project and raising money through the
Authority for low-income housing elsewhere was impugned by a report of the State
Investigation Commission, because of his use of the labor consultant. The effect of such
criticism may be to deter public entrepreneurship like Frucher's. See STATE OF N.Y.
COMM'N OF INVESTIGATION, INVESTIGATION OF THE BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION

INDUS.: REP. OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 27-38 (1986).
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payoffs and kickbacks, but it has broken down any kind of on-going
working relationship between agencies and their contractors. The fear of
official corruption and the appearance of corruption makes it impossible
to vest City officials with the discretionary authority to choose to work
with those contractors in whom they have the most faith and confidence,
as a private individual would do in building a private home or office. The
competitive bidding system has contributed to a contracting system that
makes it difficult to accomplish basic contracting goals and continues to
be abused by corrupt officials and contractors.
In the corruption-sensitive political environment that has dominated
New York City since the mid-1980s scandals, the Charter's new
contracting provisions direct City officials to give more attention than ever
before to the integrity of contractors. Consequently, City officials have
designed comprehensive disclosure forms for contractors to fill out on pain
of perjury and debarment for false statements. Furthermore, City officials
are busy entering all sorts of information about contractors into the
VENDEX database, which is supposed to warn agency officials about
contractors' lack of integrity. Even the non-mayoral agencies and public
authorities are competing to appear holier-than-thou in their contractual
relationships. According to an official in the City Comptroller's office,
in the rush to ferret out "bad actors," lack of evidence does not stand in
the way:
[It is] appropriate to not do business with a shady contractor even
if there is not enough evidence to prove a violation of law and
prosecute. New York City should be able to make market choices
about who it does business with as it has in the past by barring
contracts with South Africa and Northern Ireland . ...
The drive to rid New York City contracting of corrupt influences is
similar to other contemporary social control movements such as the war
on drugs. The overreach of various drug war strategies is said to be the
price that must be paid for a drug-free society. Likewise, the goal of a
corruption-free City would require a war on corruption, the costly
investigation and monitoring of thousands of contractors, subcontractors
and vendors (not to mention unions), and the debarment of an
indeterminable number. The whole enterprise bristles with questions of
practicality and fairness.
An entire system of norms, rules, and procedures, nourished by
greater resources and personnel, will ultimately be necessary to implement
a fair and comprehensive system to assess the integrity of government
contractors. Ironically, the higher the moral ground taken by government,
201. Anonymous interview.
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the higher the standard that it will be held to and the greater the criticism
to which it will be subjected when it becomes known, as it inevitably will,
that a particular contract is being performed by a firm associated with
some "gangster."'
That kind of exaggerated ambition will ultimately
reinforce the cycle of scandals and reforms.

202. In the winter of 1994, the media blasted the City's snow removal effort. The
problem was not that the city was over-charged when it awarded these emergency
contracts or that the work had not been performed competently or expeditiously, but that
eleven of the snow removal companies had "checkered pasts, ranging from suspected
mob ties to criminal convictions." Kevin Flynn, Plow Now Anyhow, Buried City Hired
Tainted Contractors,N.Y. NEWvSDAY, Feb. 28, 1994, at 7.

